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THE GOVERNING AUTHORITY'S RESPONSIBILITIES
IN COMPLIANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT, AS SEEN
IN THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S DRAFT
PRINCIPLES OF COMPLIANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT,
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James A. Fanto*
ABSTRACT
This Essay discusses the project on compliance and risk management of the
American Law Institute in relation to the governance of compliance and risk
management in an organization. It identifies several important governance issues
and debates that have emerged in the drafting process. These issues are (i) the
appropriate role of what the project calls the "highest legal authority" in
compliance and risk management and (ii) the related topic of to whom internal
control officers, particularly the chief compliance officer and the chief risk officer,
report. While discussing the importance of and the project's approach to, these
issues, the Essay emphasizes that the project provides flexibility to organizations,
which reflects the diversity of organizational practice on these, and other,
governance issues.
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INTRODUCTION
As an academic,. I follow the compliance and risk management professions
and developments in these fields,' but I do not practice in them. Thus, when
* Gerald Baylin Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This Essay is based upon a panel
presentation titled "It's Only Dicta-Caremark's Impact on Compliance, Risk Management, and
Governance," at the 2017 Temple Law Review Symposium, held on October 26, 2017. The symposium
was titled "The Caremark Decision at 21: Corporate Compliance Comes of Age-What Does the
Future Hold?"
1. I began to write about compliance primarily because of my work on the regulation of broker-
dealers. See NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW & REGULATION (4th ed.
2007).
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presenting at the Temple Law Review Symposium in October 2017, I talked
about issues related to the governance of compliance and risk management from
an academic perspective. This perspective complemented the presentations of
others who understand significant issues in compliance and risk management as
practitioners. In particular, I discussed the governance of compliance and risk
management in relation to a project of The American Law Institute (ALI) with
which I am involved. This Principles of Law project, titled Compliance,
Enforcement, and Risk Management for Corporations, Nonprofits, and Other
Organizations and referred to hereinafter as the ALI Compliance Project,
involves, among other things, formulating principles of compliance and risk
management.2
It might be useful to situate the ALI Compliance Project by explaining why
it is appropriate to articulate these principles now. Ever since Chancellor Allen
delivered the In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation decision, 3
compliance has become a recognized internal control function in many
organizations.' The growth and establishment of compliance in organizations is
due to a complex interaction among judges, regulators, prosecutors, and the
organizations themselves.5 As discussed by others in this conference, 6 Delaware
courts, beginning with Caremark, have held that the board of a corporation has
the responsibility to ensure that management has established a reasonable
system to prevent and to detect violations of the law or regulation.7 The
Delaware judges drew support partly from the Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.8 Under the
Guidelines, a firm that was criminally liable because of crimes committed by its
employees could receive credit in its sentencing if that firm had an effective
compliance and ethics program as defined by the Guidelines.9 In addition, on the
2. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT, AND RISK MANAGEMENT FOR
CORPORATIONS, NONPROFITS, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No.
3, 2017) [hereinafter, ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT]. This project is still underway and not finalized as
of the publication of this Essay. Thus, its principles, which I discuss below, remain preliminary and
subject to change.
3. See 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
4. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 965-72
(2009) (highlighting the growth of compliance and the reasons for it, including Caremark).
5. See id. at 958-79 (discussing these different influences in the growth of compliance).
6. See generally Symposium, The Caremark Decision at 21-Corporate Compliance Comes of
Age, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 597 (2018).
7. See, e.g., Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 ("[A] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in
good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is
adequate, exists. . .. "); see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 365 (Del. 2006) (accepting that board's
oversight obligation includes the responsibility to ensure that the corporation has a compliance
function adequate for the organization).
8. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (approving the Caremark standard); Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969
(discussing the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 1991)).
9. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016)
(laying out the elements of an effective compliance and ethics program); id. § 8C2.5(f) (discussing the
effect of a compliance program in determining the organization's culpability score for a calculation of
a fine to be assessed).
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basis of their governing statutes, regulators required organizations under their
authority to have a compliance function. 10 For example, in 2004 the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) required registered investment advisers to
have a compliance program with a chief compliance officer (CCO). 1' In an
entirely different domain, the Office of Inspector General for the Department of
Health and Human Services directed hospitals to have a compliance program
managed by a CCO. 12
To guide organizations in their response to this judicial and regulatory
activity, scholars and practitioners have developed codes, best practices, and
guidelines regarding the duties of compliance officers and the structure of
compliance programs.1 3 Today many organizations have compliance programs
administered by a CCO or by a person in the organization in charge of its
compliance activities. 14
Risk management has also gained attention in the legal community,
although by following a different path from compliance.15 In financial
institutions, which need to manage their credit and market risks, risk
management has been a subject of operational and business attention for some
time.16 The practice of risk management received considerable legal attention,
again primarily in financial institutions, because of the financial crisis of 2007-
2008.17 This crisis was regarded as an event that exposed defective risk-
management practices in large financial institutions, which contributed to their
failure or near failure and to the near collapse of the financial system."
10. See infra notes 11-12.
11. See Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg.
74,714, 74,715 (Dec. 24, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 275, 279) (setting forth, among other
things, Rule 206(4)-7 to this effect).
12. See Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg.
8,987, 8,989 (Feb. 23, 1998) (providing this requirement and guidance for hospitals).
13. See INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, No. 19600, COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMs-GUIDELINES (1st ed. 2014) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-
GUIDELINES] (laying out the elements of a compliance program by an organization designed to
standardize compliance practices). An early, ambitious, and useful effort to put compliance into
principles was that done by the National Center for Preventive Law. NAT'L CTR. FOR PREVENTIVE
LAW, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PRINCIPLES (1996). It set forth twenty compliance principles, id. at 1-
42, and gave over one-hundred pages of examples drawn from how compliance worked in practice in
corporations at that time. Id. at 44-147.
14. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2075,2101-02 (2016) (describing the growth of compliance departments headed by CCOs).
15. See infra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
16. See ANTHONY SAUNDERS & MARCIA MILLON CORNETT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
MANAGEMENT: A RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 168-75 (6th ed. 2008) for a discussion of financial
institutions' management of their credit and market risks, among others. See generally Anette Mikes,
Chief Risk Officers at Crunch Time: Compliance Champions or Business Partners?, 2 J. RISK MGMT.
FIN. INSTITUTIONS 7 (2008) (discussing of the growth of risk management).
17. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
18. See James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk Management in
Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731, 739-45 (2009) (discussing
problems in risk management leading up to the crisis).
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Following the crisis there was litigation raising the issue about the responsibility
of the board of a public company for the company's risk-management practices
and program, just as Caremark had done for compliance. 19 The Dodd-Frank Act,
passed in response to the crisis,20 directed federal banking regulators to develop
risk-management standards for large bank holding companies to adopt.21 Thus,
in bank regulation, risk management became a subject of law and regulation. 22
As in the case of compliance, this judicial, legal, and regulatory activity then
motivated efforts by private actors to develop recommended risk management
practices and governance. 23
In light of all of this activity in both compliance and risk management, the
ALI considered it timely to look at the standards that have emerged from these
legal and advisory developments, as well as the practice of compliance and risk
management, in order to see whether general principles of the law could be
articulated. 24 In its work, the ALI typically identifies law-related fields that
might be ready for this kind of summation or rationalization and then assembles
experts to conduct it. 25 In this case, the resulting principles are intended to
19. See, e.g., In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL
4826104, at *22 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) ("If an actionable duty to monitor business risk exists, it
cannot encompass any substantive evaluation by a court of a board's determination of the appropriate
amount of risk. Such decisions plainly involve business judgment."); In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124-26 (Del. Ch. 2009) (reasoning that business judgment rule is
particularly protective of a board facing a claim of oversight failure with respect to its oversight of
business risks); see also G20/OECD, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 56 (2015) (stating
board responsibility to ensure "that appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems
for risk management, financial and operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant
standards" are required under Principle VI.D.7).
20. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). For background on Dodd-Frank, see MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 63 (1st ed. 2016).
21. See, e.g., OCC Guidelines Establishing Heightened Standards for Certain Large Insured
National Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations, and Insured Federal Branches, 12 C.F.R. pt.
30, app. D (2017) (providing guidelines on risk management).
22. See id.
23. One of the most notable examples of this activity was accomplished by the Treadway
Commission, which promulgated guidance on risk management throughout an organization, which
was known as enterprise risk management or "ERM." See, e.g., COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE
TREADWAY COMM'N, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: ALIGNING RISK WITH STRATEGY AND
PERFORMANCE (2016) [hereinafter ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT]. International organizations
contributed to this activity. See INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, NO. 31000, RISK
MANAGEMENT-PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 12 (1st ed. 2009) (providing principles and guidelines
for risk management).
24. Professor Geoffrey Miller of New York University Law School, who is the chief reporter on
the ALI Compliance Project, was responsible for proposing it to the American Law Institute. Distilling
the Law: American Law Institute Again Taps NYU Law Faculty to Oversee Publications on Key Areas
of Practice, NYU L. NEWS (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ideas/american-law-institute
[perma: http://perma.cc/R7PV-3ZCL].
25. As it observes on its website, the "American Law Institute is the leading independent
organization in the United States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and improve the
law." See About ALI, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/about-ali/ [perma: http://perma.cc/7MH6-
VFPU] (last visited July 14, 2018).
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provide guidance to legislators, regulators, industry bodies, and organizations
about the basic elements of compliance and risk management and the structure
and duties of compliance and risk-management programs. The ALI thus began
the ALI Compliance Project, which is now in its third year of drafting. 26
Because one of the main topics of this symposium is governance of
compliance and risk management in an organization, I shall discuss the ALI
Compliance Project in relation to that subject. In essence, governance means
who is responsible for compliance and risk management in an organization and,
in particular, who makes the key decisions on these subjects. 27 In other words,
governance is about issues like the decisionmaking authority, duties, and
reporting lines of organizational actors for compliance and risk management.28
Given the limitations of time and space, it is not possible in this Essay to
cover all the compliance and risk management governance issues that we are
considering and treating in the ALI Compliance Project. We are also still
drafting our principles and receiving detailed comments on them from members
of our advisory and consultative committees.29 It may be useful at this point to
identify several important issues and debates that have emerged in the drafting
process. This exposition might also demonstrate the potential usefulness of the
ALI Compliance Project regarding the governance of compliance and risk
management that could benefit from the Project's suggested resolution. 30
The issues discussed below focus on (i) the appropriate role of what the
Project calls the "highest legal authority" in compliance and risk management
and (ii) the related topic of to whom internal control officers, particularly the
CCO and the chief risk officer (CRO), report. The role of the highest legal
authority, which is the "individual or group exercising final authority over an
organization's internal decisions," 31 such as the board of directors of an
26. The conference where this Essay was presented was scheduled near the annual meeting of
the ALI Compliance Project's advisory committee and consultative committee for a discussion of the
draft principles. As the ALI describes the project, this "project will address the need for a set of
recommended standards and best practices on the law of compliance and risk management."
Compliance, Enforcement, and Risk Management for Corporations, Nonprofits, and Other
Organizations, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/projects/show/compliance-enforcement-and-risk-
management-corporations-nonprofits-and-other-organizations/ [perma: http://perma.cc/Z6VC-
MUBZ] (last visited July 14,2018).
27. Indeed, in our most current draft, we say the following: "1.01(v) Governance. The process
by which decisions relative to risk management and compliance are made within an organization."
ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 1.01(v).
28. See id. § 3.01 (discussing the functions of governance).
29. Under the ALI project structure, an advisory committee is a selected group of ALI
members and others who are tasked with offering comments on and reviewing a particular project,
often because they have expertise in the subject matter. A consultative committee is composed of only
ALI members who have expressed interest in the project and attend committee meetings to offer their
views on a project's drafts. See Project Life Cycle, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/projects/project-life-
cycle/ [perma: http://perma.cc/FF57-BTHB] (last visited July 14,2018).
30. The difficulty of formulating principles in this domain is exacerbated by the fact that we are
trying to offer principles that would apply to both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations and both
large and small organizations. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 2.02 cmt. a.
31. Id. § 1.01(x).
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organization, is important to specify. After all, the duties of the highest legal
authority was the subject of Caremark32 and is often treated by regulation and in
practical guidance. 33 As discussed below, the challenge of the ALI Compliance
Project is articulating the duties of the highest legal authority while recognizing
that its role is primarily reactive. Senior executives, with the help of internal
control officers, design and propose compliance and risk-management programs
to the highest legal authority for its approval. 34 In light of the authority's
traditionally reactive role on these matters, it is important to identify the
compliance and risk-management issues where, under our recommendation, the
highest legal authority should take an active role. As I shall also highlight and as
might be expected, this active role is evidenced by the use of specialized
compliance and risk-management committees of the highest legal authority.35
The second issue, reporting by internal control officers, is clearly related to
the first because the highest legal authority often exercises its oversight of
compliance and risk management through its access to and reports from these
officers.36 This issue raises a governance matter because reporting has several
meanings, from providing information to being subject to the authority of an
organizational actor.37 For example, internal control officers might provide
information to the highest legal authority while also doing the same for senior
executives who direct their activities in the organization. 38 How internal control
officers balance these reporting responsibilities is explored further below.
The Essay will proceed as follows. Section I provides, as necessary
background, a brief account of the growth of compliance and risk management
and the basic elements of compliance and risk-management programs. Section II
discusses the responsibilities of the highest legal authority in compliance and risk
management and explores the approach that the ALI Compliance Project takes
in dealing with issues arising from the authority's oversight of these domains.
Section III then raises the issue of reporting by internal control officers and
explains, and justifies, the tentative design of this reporting recommended by the
Project.
I. COMPLIANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Before talking about the specifics of the governance of compliance and risk
management, it is useful to specify what exactly the fields of compliance and risk
32. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
33. See COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 8 (setting out
the responsibilities of the governing body in compliance); infra notes 95-99 (providing examples from
regulators).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 101-06 for examples of the responsibilities of
management in developing and executing compliance and risk management programs.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 100-09.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 155-66.
37. See infra Section IV for a discussion of the methods employed by the highest legal authority
to conduct a risk-management program.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 112-16 for a description of the roles of CCOs and CROs.
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management are. Compliance is essentially an internal control function of an
organization that is designed to ensure that the organization, its employees, and
other agents comply with laws, regulations, applicable professional or industry
standards, and the organization's ethical standards. 39 Typically, although not
exclusively, this internal control function is represented by a compliance
department, which is composed of compliance officers directed by the CCO.40
The compliance department ensures that organizational actors comply with their
legal and other obligations through the organization's compliance program,
which sets forth the ways in which the department helps the organization and its
employees achieve compliant conduct.41
Before outlining the basic elements of a compliance program, it may be
helpful to say a few more words about why organizations need a compliance
function. 42 In general, organizations are concerned that they will have liability
because a wrongful act or crime is committed by one of their employees or
agents acting on its behalf.43 This organizational liability has its origins in tort
and agency laws, which place liability upon an organization for tortious conduct
done by its agents, particularly its employees. 44 The paradigmatic doctrine of
organizational liability is respondeat superior.45 This tort law doctrine, which
criminal law adopted, provides that, in specific contexts, an organization may be
criminally liable if an agent acting in the organization's business or affairs
engages in criminal conduct.46 In their early years, moreover, federal
government agencies typically borrowed the common law doctrines of
organizational liability in their own enforcement actions so that they could reach
the firms where misconduct had occurred, in addition to prosecuting the
violator.47 in some cases, to supplement these common law doctrines, Congress
39. See GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
COMPLIANCE 3 (2d ed. 2017) ("'Compliance' refers to the processes by which an organization polices
its own behavior to ensure that it conforms to applicable rules and regulations.").
40. See Griffith, supra note 14, at 2102-02.
41. Professor Miller defines a compliance program as "the mechanisms that an organization
uses to ensure compliance, and the procedures that it employs when possible instances of
noncompliance are discovered." MILLER, supra note 39, at 201. In an important rationalization of
compliance, the Internal Standard Organisation referred to the mechanisms as "processes."
COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 19.
42. The reasons have already been alluded to above. See supra text accompanying notes 4-9 for
a discussion of the reasons for organizations to implement a compliance program.
43. See Griffith, supra note 14, at 2082-83 (describing this issue).
44. See infra note 45.
45. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (stating the general
liability of principal for actions of its agent); cf id. § 7.05 cmt. a (explaining that this liability arises
from the tort law concept that a person who is in a special relationship with another owes third parties
a duty of reasonable care with respect to the foreseeable risks posed by that relationship).
46. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473,
491-500 (2006) (discussing the origins of the use of this liability in criminal law).
47. See, e.g., Task Force on Broker-Dealer Supervision & Compliance of the Comm. on Fed.
Regulation of Sec., Broker-Dealer Supervision of Registered Representatives and Branch Office
Operations, 44 BUS. LAw. 1361, 1363-64 (1989) (discussing the initial legal theories for imposing
supervisory liability upon broker-dealers by the Securities and Exchange Commission).
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gave the government agencies express statutory power to prosecute firms and
managerial employees for their failure to supervise employees and other agents
if the latter violated laws or regulations. 48 Through the imposition of supervisory
liability regulators effectively made firms use their resources and personnel (that
is, supervisors) to ensure their employees' compliance with the applicable law
and regulations. 49
Given the risk of organizational liability, organizations thus need a firm
function to keep track of all the legal obligations applicable to an organization
and its employees and to specify how conduct can be done so as to comply with
these obligations. 50 This need has grown as the obligations have proliferated,
particularly in highly regulated industries.51 The compliance department, led by
the CCO and staffed with compliance officers, became that firm function, even if
in early days and still in some organizations today it is undertaken by
organizational actors who are not compliance officers. 52 Moreover, firms have
been encouraged to establish compliance departments because, in some cases,
having an effective compliance and supervisory system is a defense to
organizational liability.53 For example, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide
organizations with relief in sentencing if they have an effective (and Guidelines-
specified) compliance and ethics program.54 To take another example, a broker-
dealer can escape supervisory liability if it establishes supervisory procedures,
which direct its supervisors how to oversee the firm's brokers, and a supervisory
system, which provides for adequate supervisory staffing and resources to
implement the procedures, and if it then puts the system into effect. 5
48. For a discussion of how this occurred with respect to broker-dealers under the federal
securities laws, see James A. Fanto, The Vanishing Supervisor, 41 J. CORP. L. 117, 134-43 (2015)
[hereinafter Fanto, Vanishing Supervisor] (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2012), which imposed
supervisory liability upon broker-dealers and defenses to that liability).
49. See, e.g., Fanto, Vanishing Supervisor, supra note 48, at 138-39 (discussing how the
Securities and Exchange Commission determined that it needed firm personnel to help with the
enforcement of laws in broker-dealers). Organizational liability thus promotes "internal," as opposed
to "external," enforcement of the law. See MILLER, supra note 39, at 197-228 (discussing "Internal
Enforcement").
50. See MILLER, supra note 39, at 197-228 (his chapter on "Internal Enforcement").
51. See Kirsten Grind & Emily Glazer, Nuns with Guns: The Strange Day-to-Day Struggles
Between Bankers and Regulators, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2016, 10:39 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/nuns-with-guns-the-strange-day-to-day-struggles-between-bankers-and-
regulators-1464627601 [perma: http://perma.cc/6PMT-V9FV] (discussing the proliferation of
regulations affecting banks).
52. See John H. Walsh, A History of Compliance, in MODERN COMPLIANCE: BEST PRACTICES
FOR SECURITIES & FINANCE 5, 5-62 (David H. Lui & John H. Walsh eds., 2015) (reviewing the history
of compliance in the financial sector).
53. See Fanto, Vanishing Supervisor, supra note 48, at 134-43 (discussing the defense).
54. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of a compliance
program on an organization's liability under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2012) (providing this defense to supervisory liability for
broker dealers). For a discussion of the SEC's interpretation of the elements of this defense, see James
A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in Compliance for Broker-Dealers, 2014 BYU L.
REv. 1121, 1179-80 [hereinafter Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor].
[Vol. 90706
ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT
Indeed, Congress and regulatory agencies today require regulated firms to
have a compliance program and specify in detail the program's requirements. 56
For example, in the regulation of swap dealers under Dodd-Frank, Congress
required the dealers to have a compliance program and outlined what the
program must involve.57 The regulator assigned authority over this kind of firm
(the SEC for security-based swap dealers and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) for swap dealers) then establishes in more detail through
its regulation the required elements of the program.58 In effect, as this example
shows, compliance programs have become so standardized that Congress or a
regulator can confidently enumerate their features. 59
There are several basic elements of most compliance programs, which is a
way of setting forth the typical responsibilities of compliance officers.
Compliance officers draft the compliance policies and procedures, which explain,
sometimes in considerable detail and in a step-by-step way, how employees and
other agents are to conduct their activities in the organization in accordance with
the applicable laws, regulations and ethical standards.60 The policies outline the
general purpose of or need for these standards of conduct, and the procedures
provide the detailed guidance.61 Naturally, these policies and procedures must be
geared to the organization's activities and its particular risks of noncompliance,
which means that they must be drafted to respond to a compliance risk
assessment. 62 They must also be constantly updated and changed to reflect legal
and other developments in these activities. 63 Supervisory policies and procedures
guide supervisors in their supervision of the employees and might well be a part
of the compliance policies and procedures.64 Compliance officers also train and
educate board members, executives, managers, employees, and agents in all
these procedures. 65 This education includes activities promoting the
56. See infra notes 57-58.
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10(k)(1) (requiring each security-based swap dealer and participant to
have a CCO).
58. See 17 C.F.R. § 3.3(a) (2017) (CFTC's implementing rule); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15Fk-1(a) (2017)
(SEC's implementing rule).
59. See MILLER, supra note 39, at 197-220 (laying out some of the basic elements of compliance
programs, such as establishing compliance policies and procedures, doing background checks,
conducting training and monitoring and doing investigations).
60. See COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYsTEMs-GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 12 (listing these
and other responsibilities of the compliance function in paragraph 5.3.4).
61. See MILLER, supra note 39, at 197, 201.
62. See COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 7 (referring to
paragraph 4.6 entitled the "Identification, analysis and evaluation of compliance risks").
63. See, e.g., Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg.
8,987, 8,993 (Feb. 23, 1998) (listing the CCO's responsibilities to include overseeing and monitoring
implementation of the compliance program and periodically revising it).
64. See John H. Walsh, Right the First Time: Regulation, Quality, and Preventive Compliance in
the Securities Industry, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 165, 189-91 [hereinafter Walsh, Right the First
Time] (describing compliance and supervisory procedures).
65. See COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 12 (noting in
paragraph 5.3.4 that the "compliance function... shall be responsible for... providing or organizing
on-going training support for employees to ensure that all relevant employees are trained on a regular
7072018]1
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organization's ethical standards that help define its culture. 66 The officers,
moreover, monitor compliance with the procedures, which involves oversight
and surveillance of the organization's employees and activities; today this often
involves electronic surveillance. 67 If, in the course of this surveillance,
compliance officers come upon a potential breach of the procedures, which could
be a legal violation or a violation of firm ethical standards, they may investigate
it and, if necessary, remedy it and refer the violator to the appropriate authority
in the organization.6 8 In the alternative, compliance officers may leave this kind
of investigatory matter to the legal department, which can exercise attorney-
client and other privileges in conducting an investigation.69 Compliance officers
also advise employees and others in the organization about the compliance
implications of their decisions, particularly in borderline or "grey" areas where
the procedures do not define well what compliant conduct is. 70 Finally, an
important part of a compliance program is that it is regularly tested and audited
to ensure that it is effective and that any problems in it are corrected. 71
As noted, risk management did not emerge from a particular body of law.
Instead, it was originally a financial practice dealing with the management of
credit and market risks in the commercial banking sector. 72 As also noted above,
risk management acquired a legal significance when it became legally mandated
in large financial firms.73 Risk management has arguably gone farther than
basis").
66. See id. at 16-17 (discussing compliance culture in paragraph 7.3.2.3).
67. See James Fanto, Dashboard Compliance: Benefit, Threat, or Both?, 11 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 1, 11-12 (2016) (explaining compliance monitoring and its current automation); see
also KPMG, LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION TO ESTABLISH A MORE EFFECTIVE
REGULATORY ECOSYSTEM 3 (2017) (arguing for the need for "Regulation Technology" in firms so
that they can become more efficient in compliance).
68. See COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, INTERNAL CONTROL-
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 150 (2012) [hereinafter INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED
FRAMEWORK] (noting that collaboration between legal or compliance personnel and business
management is necessary to "manage adverse outcomes such as regulatory sanctions, legal liability,
and failure to adhere to internal compliance policies and procedures").
69. See Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization May
Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 71, 122 (2014) (discussing this limitation on CCO's
conducting an investigation).
70. See COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 12 (explaining
in paragraph 5.3.4, that one of the tasks of the compliance function is "providing objective advice to
the organization on compliance-related matters"); see also Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor, supra
note 55, at 1163 (discussing "internal" compliance, which includes providing advice).
71. This is done by the compliance officers themselves, see COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS-GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 25 (paragraph 9.2), and also by the internal auditors. See
INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, supra note 68, at 151 ("The scope of internal
auditing is typically expected to include oversight, risk management, and internal control, and assisting
the organization in maintaining effective control by evaluating their [sic] effectiveness and efficiency
and by promoting continual improvement. Internal audit communicates findings and interacts directly
with management, the audit committee, and/or the board of directors.").
72. See supra text accompanying note 15-16.
73. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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compliance in becoming an established part of organizations.7 4 Indeed, it has
become a dominant paradigm through which organizations assess conduct and
has even influenced compliance. 75 Under the enterprise risk management
(ERM) approach, 76 all risks facing an organization, whether in its activities or
from outside, are identified and measured. 77 The organization then determines
whether it can eliminate particular risks or amounts of risk, leaving residual
risks.78 The organization decides its "risk appetite"-the level of residual risk
that is acceptable to it-and ensures that its risks stay within that risk appetite.79
In other words, a given amount of risk is acceptable in most business activities.80
Risk management, as well as ERM, is a disciplined way for an organization to
conduct its activities and affairs in light of the ever-present risks.81
If an organization were to use this risk-management approach in
compliance, it would identify the laws and regulations applicable to an
organization and its actors and the organizational activities where there would be
the greatest number of legal violations, generally those of a serious nature. 82 It
would then try to prevent, or at least reduce the number of, these violations by
putting most of its compliance resources in those areas.83 However,
organizational actors cannot publicly assert, as they would for nonlegal risks, that
they accept or tolerate a certain number of legal violations in the organization's
activities, even if they realize that a compliance program cannot prevent all
violations. 84 Public authorities, such as regulators and prosecutors, expect them
to espouse no tolerance for legal risks.8 5
The elements of a risk-management program, which a CRO and risk
officers would administer, are similar in general format to those of the
74. See MILLER, supra note 39, at 710-17 (discussing risk management's history and
establishment in organizations of all kinds).
75. See id. at 710.
76. See ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 10 (defined as "[t]he culture,
capabilities, and practices, integrated with strategy-setting and its execution, that organizations rely on
to manage risk in creating, preserving, and realizing value").
77. See id. at 62-68.
78. See id. at 69.
79. See ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 17-20 (outlining this approach of
understanding an organization's "risk profile," setting its "risk appetite" and dealing with variation in
performance); see also MILLER, supra note 39, at 745-49 (discussing risk appetite and identification
and acceptance of residual risk).
80. ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 17-20.
81. See id. at 6-7.
82. See ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 17-20.
83. Id.
84. See MILLER, supra note 39, at 720 (noting that violations are part of operational risk); id. at
749 (observing, in an example, that a certain number of these violations are part of residual risk). It
appears that organizations are trying to create risk appetites for non-financial risks, like compliance,
and that compliance risk is one of their chief areas of concern. See, e.g., EY, RETHINKING RISK
MANAGEMENT: BANKS Focus ON NON-FINANCIAL RISKS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 35-36 (2015)
(discussing "risk appetite").
85. See MILLER, supra note 39, at 711.
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compliance program. With the assistance of senior executives, risk officers
conduct an intensive evaluation of the risks facing their organization and assess
their probability of occurrence. 86 At this point they would present the
information to the organization's governing body, with a proposal from senior
management about which risks and levels of risk could be eliminated, which are
the residual risks, and which of such residual risks are acceptable for the
organization to incur.87 This would be the organization's risk appetite, typically
embodied in a risk appetite statement.88 With the risk appetite statement as a
guidepost, the risk officers enact controls so that the organization's risks are
managed so as to stay within the limits or parameters of the risk appetite
statement.89 As in the case of compliance, the risk officers instruct organizational
actors about the risk limits, monitor the actors' compliance with these limits,
provide advice on risk-management issues, and investigate any violations of the
risk-management program. In addition, they must periodically test the risk-
management program and update it to take account of new, emerging risks or of
an enhancement of existing ones. 90
As the reference to actions of risk officers, senior management, and the
governing authority make clear, governance is an essential part of compliance
and risk-management programs. These programs assign responsibility for
compliance and risk management in an organization and set forth a chain of
command for compliance and risk-management decisionmaking and
responsibilities. Indeed, the classical tripartite view of internal control has much
to do with governance.91 Under this view, internal control officers like
compliance officers and risk officers design and administer compliance and risk-
management programs, organizational actors do their business in accordance
with these programs, and internal auditors verify that both the officers and actors
are conducting themselves in line with the programs and that the programs
86. See ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 44-46.
87. See ABA Section of Bus. Law, Comm. on Corp. Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook-
Sixth Edition, 66 Bus. LAW. 975, 986, 998-1000 (2011).
88. See ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 47-50; see also ABA Section of Bus.
Law, Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 87, at 998 (discussing a public company board's expected
understanding a firm's risk profile and its management of risks). Board risk oversight has traditionally
been the task of the board audit committee. See, e.g., NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 303A.07(b)(iii)(D) cmt. (2018) ("The audit committee is not required to be the sole body responsible
for risk assessment and management, but, as stated above, the committee must discuss guidelines and
policies to govern the process by which risk assessment and management is undertaken.").
89. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GUIDELINES: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR BANKS ¶ 107 (2014) (providing the "CRO is responsible for
supporting the board in its development of the bank's risk appetite and RAS [risk appetite statement]
and for translating the risk appetite into a risk limits structure" in paragraph 107); see also
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 53-59.
90. See ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 23, at 100-01 (discussing monitoring ERM
and improving it). Risk officers also oversee the communication to all organizational actors concerning
risks and the organization's risk limits and controls. See id. at 90-92; see also INTERNAL CONTROL-
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, supra note 68, at 149.
91. See INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, supra note 68, at 145-52 (describing
the internal control duties of the main governance actors).
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themselves are effective. 92
II. THE ROLE OF THE HIGHEST LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ITS COMMITTEES
A crucial governance issue in compliance and risk management is the role
of the organization's highest legal authority in these internal control functions.
The highest legal authority is the generic name for the supreme governing body
in an organization, like the board of directors in a public company or a board of
trustees in a large not-for-profit. 93 It is now well established that this authority
must oversee the organization's compliance and risk management programs just
as it oversees and supervises all organizational activities. 94 This is the import of
Caremark, at least for compliance: the board of directors must ensure, as part of
its duty of care, that a company has a compliance program adequate for its
circumstances. 95 Regulators and other government authorities have affirmed, or
reaffirmed, this oversight responsibility of the highest legal authority. 96 Under
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, referenced as support by the Court of Chancery
in Caremark,97 an organization may receive credit in sentencing for its
compliance and ethics program if, among other things, the highest legal authority
has oversight responsibility over it.98 In numerous industries, regulators require
that the board or its equivalent of the regulated organization approve the
establishment of a compliance and risk-management program. 99
The central inquiry, then, becomes identifying the elements of this oversight
responsibility or, put another way, explaining how the governing authority would
exercise this responsibility. At the very least, as Caremark suggests, the
governing authority must ensure that the senior executives of an organization
establish compliance and risk-management programs adequate for the
organization's circumstances. 100  But how exactly this allocation of
responsibilities of the authority and the executives works is an important
92. See id. at 147.
93. See supra note 31.
94. See, e.g., COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 8 (setting
forth the compliance responsibilities of the governing body).
95. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[A]
director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information
and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists .....
96. See infra notes 97-99.
97. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969.
98. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2016).
99. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2017) (mandating board approval of the compliance
program of a registered investment company, as well as those of its advisors and service providers);
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 08-8, COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT
PROGRAMS AND OVERSIGHT AT LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS WITH COMPLEX COMPLIANCE
PROFILES (Oct. 16, 2008) (oversight of compliance in large financial institutions by their boards);
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDANCE
FOR HEALTH CARE GOVERNING BOARDS ON COMPLIANCE OVERSIGHT 1 (2015) (taking as a given a
health-care board's responsibility for oversight of compliance).
100. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
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governance issue. This is, not surprisingly, a focus of the ALI Compliance
Project. We recognize that, in all but the smallest organizations, the members of
the governing authority are generally outsiders to the functioning of the
organization and thus different from the senior executives. 101 We understand
that a typical organizational practice has senior executives, assisted by the
internal control officers, formulate, and propose for approval by the governing
authority, the compliance and risk-management programs.1 02 As in many other
organizational matters, the governing authority is thus reacting to, and expected
to consider and ultimately to approve or disapprove, the proposals.' 03 This
makes sense because, under the law of most organizations, the governing
authority oversees, and does not direct or manage, the organization's business or
affairs. 104
Certainly, the governing authority should not just passively accept
executives' proposals on compliance and risk management; their fiduciary duty
demands more.10 Without expecting the governing authority's members to
rethink the compliance program proposal, on the basis of their own experience
and of the information provided to them, they should actively evaluate the
proposal and be convinced that it makes sense for the organization. To do this
they should have the background, experience or education, or receive advice, to
understand the legal obligations to which the organization and its employees and
other agents are subject. Advice could come from the general counsel, the CCO,
or outside compliance experts. Each could provide an understanding of the
design of an appropriate compliance program for organizations comparable to
their own. 106 Therefore, an issue for the ALI Compliance Project is to have a
101. See ABA Section of Bus. Law, Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 87, at 1005 (making this
point). There may be some overlap, of course, as in the case of public companies where the chair of
the board is often the chief executive officer.
102. See INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, supra note 68, at 150-52
(discussing these responsibilities); see also KPMG, THE COMPLIANCE JOURNEY: BOOSTING THE
VALUE OF COMPLIANCE IN A CHANGING REGULATORY CLIMATE 5 (2017) (discussing the breakdown
of responsibilities).
103. See, e.g., COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMs-GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 8
(observing that the governing body formally approves the compliance policy, and top management
makes sure that the commitment to compliance is realized in the organization).
104. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) ("[A]ll corporate
powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, the business and affairs of the corporation shall
be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors.").
105. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (noting that liability can attach to
directors where "(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or
controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or
oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring
their attention").
106. See Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era of
Compliance, 53 AM. Bus. L.J. 203, 209 (2016) (describing the general counsel's role in providing
information to directors and executives on legal risks); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016) (stating that an "organization's
governing authority shall be knowledgeable about the content and operation of the compliance and
ethics program").
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principle on the expected background and education (and continuing education)
of the members of the governing authority so that they will have the competence
to evaluate knowledgeably management's proposed compliance program.1 07
A similarly engaged governing authority should approve the risk-
management program. 08 Indeed, one would expect that the members of the
authority would be considerably involved in risk management because, given
their backgrounds as senior executives of other organizations, they are likely to
have a good understanding of business and operational risks,1 09 and because they
have had to propose risk appetites and limits for their own organization.11 0 As in
the case of compliance, the members of the authority are likely to draw upon the
expertise of the organization's risk specialist, the CRO, and outsider advisors,
such as risk consultants, as well as their own experience, in performing their risk-
oversight role."' There is likely to be, or should be, a vigorous debate between
governing authority members and executives over the risk-management
program. The kinds and levels of risk that an organization accepts and manages
are intertwined with its affairs, business, strategies and their ultimate success,
whereas the management of legal risks through the compliance program, while
important, is just one part of the overall ERM strategy.112
Other than to review and approve the compliance and risk management
programs, what else should be demanded of the governing authority in these
domains? Compliance and risk management programs must have adequate
staffing and resources so that they can be put into effect, and the CCO and the
CRO must be sufficiently independent of the organization's activities and have
the necessary authority to implement the programs so that the activities are
effectively controlled. Staffing, allocation of resources, and authority are
managerial matters, but as part of its oversight responsibility, the governing
authority should be reasonably satisfied that the resources are adequate to make
107. This principle is currently in Section 3.06. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2,
§ 3.06 cmt. c. It should be noted here that programs exist for new public-company directors, some in
affiliation with universities, which covers such issues as board oversight. See, e.g., Directors
Consortium, STAN. U. GRADUATE SCH. OF Bus., http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/exed/directors/ [perma:
http://perma.cc/RSE8-A2CL] (last visited July 14, 2018).
108. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. After the financial crisis, there has been
considerable focus worldwide on a board's oversight responsibilities with respect to an organization's
risk management. See, e.g., G20/OECD, supra note 19, at 56 (noting that "the board should retain final
responsibility for oversight of the company's risk management system"); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.407(h) (2017) (mandating that all public companies "disclose the extent of the board's role in the
risk oversight of the" company).
109. See, e.g., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 87, at 986, 998
(describing a board's understanding of a firm's risk profile and its management of risks); id at 987
(describing an individual director's understanding of a firm's kinds of risk).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
111. See NAT'L Ass'N OF CORP. DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON
RISK GOVERNANCE: BALANCING RISK AND REWARD 10-11 (2009) (discussing use of independent
consultants).
112. See supra note 76-80 and accompanying text.
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the programs effective. 113 The authority of internal control officers in an
organization is also typically within senior management's domain. 114 The CCO
and the CRO should have the power to administer their programs, which at the
very least means obtaining information about the organization's business or
affairs so that they can monitor them in accordance with the programs.
Therefore, when senior executives bring the compliance and risk management
programs to the governing authority for its approval, the authority has to be
satisfied that the CCO, the CRO and the other compliance and risk officers will
have the necessary organizational authority.115 In addition, the authority's review
and approval of the compliance and risk-management programs is not just a one-
time decision. Rather, the governing authority should review the effectiveness of
the programs, at an interval that it should determine but at least yearly, and
inquire of senior executives and of the CCO and the CRO whether they see the
need for and would propose any revisions to them.116
Internal control officers must be independent so that they can engage in
their work free of undue influence from those conducting the organization's
business, whom the officers are monitoring and who may resist the restrictions
imposed upon them by the compliance or risk-management programs. 117
Independence is also related to the issue whether an internal control officer can
wear two hats, an internal control one and an operational one.118 The ALI
113. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2016) (noting that the person with operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics
program should "be given adequate resources, appropriate authority, and direct access to the
governing authority or an appropriate subgroup of the governing authority"); ABA Section of Bus.
Law, Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 87, at 1000 ("Boards should also ensure the compliance
program has adequate resources and authority to perform its function."). The ALI Compliance
Project does this through section 3.07(a)(6). See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3.08(a)
("[T]he authority should... [b]e familiar with the staffing and resources allocated by executive
management to the internal-control functions of compliance, risk management, and internal audit and
satisfy itself that the functions are sufficiently independent and have appropriate authority to perform
their respective internal control responsibilities . . . .").
114. The issue of authority can raise questions about the liability of internal control officers for
legal violations occurring in an organization. See, e.g., Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor, supra note 55,
at 1179-80 (discussing supervisory liability of compliance officers in broker-dealers).
115. See supra note 86.
116. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(5)(B) (an organization with
an effective compliance and ethics program "evaluate[s] periodically the effectiveness of the
organization's compliance and ethics program"); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs.,
supra note 99, at *7 ("The board should exercise reasonable due diligence to ensure that the
compliance program remains effective by at least annually reviewing a report on the effectiveness of
the program."); ABA Section of Bus. Law, Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 87, at 999 (discussing a
public company board's review of the compliance program and its effectiveness). The ALI
Compliance Project does this through Section § 3.08(a)(9). See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra
note 2, § 3.09(a)(9).
117. COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMs-GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 11 (stating in
paragraph 5.3.3(e) that top management should, among other things, "ensure that the compliance
function has authority to act independently" and "allocate adequate and appropriate resources" to the
compliance function).
118. See INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, supra note 68, at 95-96 (discussing
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Compliance Project takes the position, echoed in regulation, 119 that having a
person conduct both internal control and other organizational responsibilities is
permissible (other than internal audit responsibilities), 120 but is not
recommended in large organizations that, because of their size and complexity,
require specialized internal control officers. 121 The governing authority's
contribution to internal control officers' independence is, at a minimum, twofold:
(i) it approves the hiring and dismissal of the officers,122 and (ii) it has a direct
line of communication with the officers because they regularly report to it.123
generally the separation of control functions from others in an organization).
119. See, e.g., FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL § 3130 supplementary
material .08 (2008), http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&element
id=6286 [perma: http://perma.cc/J87E-FJVG] ("The requirement to designate one or more chief
compliance officers does not preclude such persons from holding any other position within the
member [organization], including the position of chief executive officer, provided that such persons
can discharge the duties of a chief compliance officer in light of his or her other additional
responsibilities.").
120. See INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, supra note 68, at 151 ("Internal
auditors do not assume operating responsibilities, nor are they assigned to audit activities with which
they were involved recently in connection with prior operating assignments.").
121. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3.20(a) ("By reason of its size, limited
resources or operations, or in other circumstances, an organization may elect to have an internal
control officer be responsible for multiple internal-control functions or for non-internal-control
operations."); see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, COMPLIANCE AND THE
COMPLIANCE FUNCTION IN BANKS ¶ 28 (2005) [hereinafter BASEL COMM., COMPLIANCE AND THE
COMPLIANCE FUNCTION] ("The independence of the head of compliance and any other staff having
compliance responsibilities may be undermined if they are placed in a position where there is a real or
potential conflict between their compliance responsibilities and their other responsibilities. It is the
preference of the Committee that compliance function staff perform only compliance responsibilities.
The Committee recognises, however, that this may not be practicable in smaller banks, smaller
business units or in local subsidiaries. In these cases, therefore, compliance function staff may perform
non-compliance tasks, provided potential conflicts of interest are avoided."); INTERNAL CONTROL-
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, supra note 68, at 149 (providing support for this approach, stating "[i]n
large and complex organizations, specialized compliance professionals can be helpful in defining and
assessing controls for adherence to both external and internal requirements"). But see Donald C.
Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 71, 100-03 (discussing the factors that an organization may consider in adopting a
compliance function that is not the most independent).
122. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3.08(a)(7). There is considerable support
for this approach. For example, the board of a registered investment company (including a majority of
its independent directors) must approve the hiring, compensation, and removal of the company's chief
compliance officer. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(4)(i)-(ii) (2017). The U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission's regulations of futures commission merchants, swap dealers, and major swap
participants allow either the board of directors or a senior officer to appoint, remove, and determine
the compensation of the chief compliance officer. See 17 C.F.R. § 3.3(a) (2017); see also BASEL COMM.,
COMPLIANCE AND THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION, supra note 121, 1 27 (recommending that the board
of directors of a large banking institution be informed about the hiring and departure of the chief
compliance officer and the reasons for that departure).
123. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3.08(a)(8) (discussing lines of
communication); see also COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 11
(requiring that the governing body and top management have a compliance function with "clear and
unambiguous support from and direct access to the governing body and top management" in
paragraph 5.3.3(d)(2)); Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed.
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The first allows the governing authority to check that appropriate people are
being hired for these positions, that they are properly compensated, and that
they are not dismissed because of management's desire to hide internal control
problems or deficiencies in the organization.1 24 The second contributes to the
independence by allowing the internal control officers to discuss their concerns
directly with the governing authority, unfiltered and uninfluenced by senior
executives. 125 It also enables the authority to engage in ongoing oversight, in
addition to periodically approving the proposals of senior executives, with
respect to compliance and risk management and to be better prepared to make
their supervisory decisions on these subjects.1 26
The highest legal authority is also responsible when there has been a
material violation or failure of the compliance program or a material failure of or
deviation from the risk-management program. "Material" would have to be
defined, but, in the compliance area, it could involve, among other things, legal
violations, or a pattern of legal violations, occurring in the organization that
could have significant criminal or civil repercussions for the organization.127 In
risk management, material deviations or failures would be those actions beyond
the organization's risk appetite, limits, or controls that could threaten the
organization's business and financial position.128 There are likely two ways for
these matters to be presented to the governing authority. In the one, which relies
upon the governance hierarchy, internal control officers detect the violation,
failure, or deviation and bring it to the CCO or CRO, who alerts senior
executives.1 29 The executives, with the advice of the CCO and CRO, then resolve
upon a course of action, which could include discipline of the employees
involved, remedial measures to fix the problem, and possibly reporting to a
regulator or to other government authorities.130 The governing authority would
approve, modify, or ratify the recommended course of action, in consultation
Reg. 8,987, 8,993 (Feb. 23, 1998) (requiring that the CCO report to the hospital's governing body,
CEO, and compliance committee). The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines make this reporting by the CCO
to the highest legal authority and to "high-level personnel" an element of an effective compliance
program. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2016).
124. See supra note 117.
125. See MICHAEL D. GREENBERG, RAND CORP., TRANSFORMING COMPLIANCE: EMERGING
PARADIGMS FOR BOARDS, MANAGEMENT, COMPLIANCE OFFICERS, AND GOVERNMENT 24-25 (2014)
(discussing the importance of this reporting).
126. See Walsh, Right the First Time, supra note 64, at 236 (discussing generally the value of this
reporting in financial firms like broker-dealers and investment advisers).
127. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 1.01(hh) (defining "material" as
"[s]ignificant to an organization's reputation, effective functioning, or financial position").
128. See ABA Section of Bus. Law, Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 87, at 999 (explaining
that the board should ensure that there is an appropriate process "to encourage . .. timely reporting of
significant legal or other compliance matters to the board or an appropriate board committee")
(emphasis added)).
129. The ALI Compliance Project takes this approach. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra
note 2, § 3.08(a)(10) (directing the highest legal authority to confer with executive management).
130. See id.
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with the CCO or CRO and outside consultants, if need be.'13 If the material
violation, failure, or deviation implicated senior executives themselves or their
management, the governing authority may learn of the problem through the
direct reporting of internal control officers that was discussed above or through a
system of anonymous reporting.132 In these kinds of cases, which could involve a
management crisis, the governing authority would have to determine the
appropriate response to the material violation, failure, or deviation.1 33
In the ALI Compliance Project, we recognize that it is a well-established
practice for a governing authority to delegate its oversight of internal control to
one of its committees.1 34 This practice has the benefit of allowing a group of
members of the governing authority to develop expertise in that area, which
enhances the authority's oversight of it.t 35 An important question for us is
whether to recommend that organizations establish specialized committees for
the oversight of compliance and risk management. For public companies, under
stock exchange rules and corporate practice, these tasks have often fallen to its
audit committee that oversees a company's financial reporting and thus the
internal and external auditors, who also audit compliance and risk-management
programs, in addition to the company's preparation of financial reports.1 36
However, the typical audit committee is likely to be considerably overworked,137
and stock exchange rules permit it to delegate certain of its duties, like the
oversight of compliance, to another board committee. 138
131. See id. (directing the highest legal authority to approve or ratify remedial measures); see
also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., supra note 99, at *8 ("The board should oversee
management's implementation of the compliance program and the appropriate and timely resolution
of compliance issues by senior management.").
132. This could occur through reporting in a confidential hotline for whistleblowers. In public
companies, the audit committee is generally tasked with this responsibility to administer the hotline.
See NYSE, supra note 88, § 303A.07(b).
133. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3.08(a)(11) & cmt. i (demonstrating that
the ALI Compliance Project has this approach as one alternative for the governing authority). See
generally NAT'L Ass'N OF CORP. DIRS., supra note 111, at 40 (discussing "crisis management plan" for
governing authorities or boards).
134. Years ago, the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance recognized that, generally under
corporate law of individual States, a board of a corporation is permitted to delegate to a committee its
authority to perform one of its functions or to exercise one of its powers, subject to the board's
ultimate responsibility for oversight over the matter. See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.02 & cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (describing delegation of
powers); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25(d) & cmt. (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) (permitting such
delegation and discussing the practice). The ALI Compliance Project includes this power for the
governing authority. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3.08(b).
135. This positive side of delegation must be balanced with the interest in not reducing the
responsibilities of the entire board. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25 cmt.
136. See ABA Section of Bus. Law, Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 87, at 998-1000
(discussing use of committees in risk management and compliance); id. at 1015-19, 1021-22
(describing audit committee's responsibilities, which include oversight of internal audit and
compliance).
137. See, e.g., KPMG's AUDIT COMM. INST., 2015 GLOBAL AUDIT COMMITTEE SURVEY 4
(2015) (discussing the increasingly difficult nature of the audit committee's workload).
138. See ABA Section of Bus. Law, Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 87, at 998-1000 (noting
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The ALI Compliance Project considers it useful to give organizations
frameworks for their compliance committee and risk committees.1 39 There are
models for these kinds of committees from different domains, particularly,
although not exclusively, from the regulation of large commercial banks and
financial groups.140 With the assistance of the CCO or the CRO, as the case may
be, and its own advisors, a committee would engage in the general oversight of
compliance or risk management that the governing authority performs, as
discussed above.1 41 However, because of its specialized mission, a compliance or
risk committee could be more extensively involved with the particular internal
control function, without usurping the role of senior executives. 142 For example,
this kind of committee might approve any public disclosure and reporting to
regulators about compliance or risk management, apart from the reporting
associated with material violations, failures or deviations. 143 It could also consult
formally or informally with other committees on matters affecting compliance or
risk management. For example, the ALI Compliance Project recommends that
each committee meet with the organization's compensation committee, which
has oversight of the compensation practices of the organization, in order to
discuss how these practices might reward an executive for conduct in line with
the compliance and risk-management programs.144 In addition, some
how companies have established a compliance or legal affairs committee to ease the burden of the
audit committee).
139. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3.10 (Compliance and Ethics Committee);
id. § 3.11 (Risk Committee).
140. For example, federal bank regulators have provided a detailed model for a risk committee
since they mandate that large banking institutions have it. Section 165(h) of the Dodd-Frank Act
directed the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to require that publicly traded nonbank
financial companies supervised by it and publicly traded bank holding companies with total
consolidated assets not less than $10 billion have a board risk committee composed of independent
directors and advised by a risk management expert. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 165(h), 124 Stat. 1376, 1429 (2010) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 5365(h)); see also 12 C.F.R. § 252.22 (2017) (risk-committee requirement for publicly traded
bank-holding company having total consolidated assets of not less than $10 billion); id. § 252.33 (risk-
committee requirement for a large bank-holding company having total consolidated assets of not less
than $50 billion).
141. See supra notes 29-35; see also NAT'L CTR. FOR PREVENTIVE LAW, supra note 13, at 70.
142. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR PREVENTIVE LAW, supra note 13, at 70, 83 (discussing how a
company can create an independent board committee to oversee the CCO).
143. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3.10(d)(8)-(9) (describing the Compliance
and Ethics Committee's involvement in these tasks); id. § 3.11(d)(8)-(9) (describing the Risk
Committee). In regulated firms, including banks, broker-dealers, and investment advisers, regulators
may examine the firms, and part of this examination covers matters like compliance and risk
management. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., supra note 99, at 2 (stating its
expectations for compliance-risk-management programs at large banking organizations, to be
overseen by its examination staff). Even public companies must disclose aspects of their compliance
programs and risk management. Listed companies have to adopt and to disclose publicly (including
through a website) their code of business conduct and ethics, which must address compliance with
laws, rules, and regulations. NYSE, supra note 88, § 303A.10.
144. Thus, the ALI Compliance Project recommends that the Compensation Committee meet
with the Compliance and Ethics Committee and the Risk Committee for this purpose. See ALI
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organizations have management-level compliance and risk committees, on which
the internal control officers sit, to help ensure that the compliance and risk-
management programs are followed throughout the organization.
145 A
specialized committee of the governing authority could regularly meet with these
management-level committees and thus have a deeper understanding of the
implementation of the programs.
One question that the specialized committees raise is the value of enhanced
oversight of compliance and risk management-do its benefits justify its
increased costs? In certain domains, such as the regulation of large financial
institutions, Congress and regulators have concluded that this kind of sustained
oversight of risk management is worth the cost.146 Given the existential threat to
an organization posed by material breakdowns in its compliance, we suspect that
the governing authority's involvement in compliance oversight will continue to
increase, even if compliance committees are not yet the norm.147 Some have
expressed a concern that this specialized approach is costly, has not been proved
to be effective, and removes flexibility from organizations that might take a
different approach in their oversight of compliance. 148 We on the ALI
Compliance Project sidestep the cost-benefit issue by, as noted above, providing
organizations with models of committees that they are free to use or to reject,
depending upon their own circumstances and the demands of their regulators.
Finally, an important governance issue is the role of the governing authority
in the selection and promotion of organizational ethical values and culture with
respect to compliance and risk management. Another way of stating this is
defining the "tone at the top," a phrase often used to describe the governing
authority's role in these issues.149 This phrase appears to mean that, by their
COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3.13. As one source of support for this approach, in large bank
holding companies the risk committee must also make sure that risk management is integrated into the
compensation structure of the firm. See 12 C.F.R. § 252.33(a)(2)(ii)(D).
145. COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 10 (noting that
some organizations "have a cross-functional compliance committee to coordinate compliance across
the organization" in paragraph 5.3.2).
146. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
147. See PwC, PwC STATE OF COMPLIANCE STUDY 2016: LAYING A STRATEGIC FOUNDATION
FOR STRONG COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT 3, 13 (2016) (describing a global survey of 800
executives revealing that 20% of firms have "separate, stand-alone compliance/ethics committee,"
while 65% report that the audit committee oversees compliance); SOC'Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE &
ETHICS & NYSE GOVERNANCE SERVS., COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAM ENVIRONMENT
REPORT 27-28 (2014) (describing a survey of compliance officers in diverse organizations revealing
that, where the board has delegated the oversight of compliance and ethics to a committee (51% of
respondents), 20% of them report that the delegation is to a compliance committee, whereas 41%
report that it is to the audit committee).
148. See Griffith, supra note 14, at 2116-17 (discussing the SEC's imposition of compliance
programs without cost/benefit analysis).
149. See, e.g., Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, FINRA, Remarks From
the 2016 FINRA Annual Conference (May 23, 2016) ("The board, the CEO, business leaders and the
CCO all play critical roles in setting the tone at the top and establishing an organization's values and
ethical climate."), http://www.finra.org/newsroom/speeches/052316-remarks-201
6
-finra-annual-
conference [perma: http://perma.cc/3UP5-GDTS].
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words and actions, members of the governing authority espouse and exhibit the
values of the compliance and risk-management programs.15 0 They conform to
them and urge other organizational actors to do the same. 51 But what exactly
does this mean in concrete terms, other than for them to exercise dutifully their
oversight responsibilities, as discussed above? This issue is an important one for
organizations, for organizational scholars and social psychologists have long
established what practitioners often echo: an organization with a culture of
compliance and risk management will be more likely than another to avoid the
kind of systemic problems that bring down firms. 152 The ALI Compliance Project
discusses these issues in the commentary and the relevant literature is referenced
in the Reporter's notes."' It may be that the governing authority particularly
demonstrates its commitment to organizational values by its actions with respect
to the senior executives, such as when it dismisses them upon any evidence of
conduct contrary to the organization's values, and by not taking outsized
compensation and benefits for its members.1 54
III. REPORTING BY INTERNAL CONTROL OFFICERS
Another important governance issue for the ALI Compliance Project,
which is related to the above discussion of the responsibilities of the governing
authority, involves the reporting lines of the CCO and the CRO. As noted
above, for example, this reporting to the governing authority could promote the
independence of these officers and enhance the authority's knowledge of the
organization's compliance and risk-management programs. 55 The concept of
reporting generally has two meanings in organizations. In its strongest sense,
reporting means that an internal control officer works under the direction of a
150. See NAT'L CTR. FOR PREVENTIVE LAW, supra note 13, at 125 (discussing how senior
management sets the appropriate "tone" for an organization's compliance).
151. Id.
152. See Linda Klebe Treviflo et al., Legitimating the Legitimate: A Grounded Theory Study of
Legitimacy Work Among Ethics and Compliance Officers, 123 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSEs 186, 195 (2014) (discussing the importance of support for compliance by boards
and senior executives); see also David Hess, Ethical Infrastructures and Evidence-Based Corporate
Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from the Empirical Evidence, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. &
Bus. 317 (2016) (arguing that a compliance program must be aligned with the organization's culture to
have legitimacy in the eyes of the organization's employees); Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of
Compliance, 54 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 966-67 (2017) (underlining the importance of board members
and officers promoting ethical conduct, but emphasizing the individual and institutional pressures that
run counter to this promotion).
153. The Project has a provision requiring that the governing authority and executive
management "promote an organizational culture of compliance and sound risk management." ALI
COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3.07(a). It then suggests a number of ways for them to do this:
(i) approving the values, ethical standards, and risk culture; (ii) satisfying themselves that
organizational practices support these values, standards, and culture; (iii) assuring themselves that
employees and agents will live up to them; and (iv) communicating, and demonstrating by their
actions, and their adherence to them. Id. § 3.07(b)(1)-(4).
154. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 99, at 7 (stating that
the board should make sure that incentive structures promote compliance).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22.
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particular executive, who has the authority to determine the conditions of the
officer's employment and to hire and fire him or her; the officer is a "direct
report" of the executive. 156 Under the other meaning, which is actually subsumed
in the first, the internal control officer provides information to and advises an
executive, the governing authority or one of the latter's committees. 157
Organizations have numerous possibilities with respect to the reporting, in
both senses of the term, by the internal control officers.158 Take first the question
of to whom the CCO or CRO should report, that is, who has direct control or
authority over the officer. One possibility is that they report to a senior
executive, even to the CEO.159 As officers in an organizational hierarchy, it
would make sense that they should be subject to the authority of another
executive who decides to hire them, sets their compensation and other terms of
employment and, if they do not fit in or perform satisfactorily, to fire them.160
On the one hand, if the governing authority, or a committee of the same, were to
have complete control over internal control officers, this control might detract
from the managerial power of senior executives, particularly the CEO, who
generally have authority over lesser officers in an organization.1 61 On the other
hand, as noted above, giving the governing authority a veto or check on the
hiring and firing of CCO and the CRO might make sense in terms of enhancing
the authority's oversight of the compliance and risk management functions.1 6
2
Assuming that these internal control officers report to another executive,
which executive should have direct authority over them? The CCO could report
to the CEO, the chief operating officer, the chief financial officer, the CRO or
the general counsel, to name a few possible reporting structures.163 General
counsels and their intellectual supporters have made a case for having the CCO
in their reporting line because they are the central legal authority in an
organization (compliance after all mainly deals with compliance with the law)
and because they have oversight of all legal proceedings affecting the
organization, such as investigations.1 64 It thus might make sense to have CCOs
156. See LRN, THE 2014 ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS REPORT 9
(2014) (distinguishing "reporting" to another officer or the board from "updating" the board).
157. See id.
158. See id. (identifying four such possibilities); LRN, THE 2015 ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE
EFFECTIVENESS REPORT 7 (2015) [hereinafter LRN, THE 2015 REPORT] (identifying eight such
possibilities).
159. See LRN, THE 2015 REPORT, supra note 158, at 7 (identifying this as a common reporting
structure).
160. See NAT'L CTR. FOR PREVENTIVE LAW, supra note 13, at 79-84 (discussing generally how
the organization's compliance officer fits within the structure of the organization).
161. See ABA Section of Bus. Law, Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 87, at 985 (pointing out
that the board typically delegates management of the firm to professional managers).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22.
163. See supra notes 155-57.
164. See Bird & Park, supra note 106 (discussing the debate over the CLO's role in compliance
with the emergence of stand-alone chief compliance officers and identifying the CLO's contributions
to compliance); DeStefano, supra note 69 (comprehensively covering the relationship of compliance
and legal departments, regulators' pressures to separate the two, and the intellectual debates on the
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report to the general counsel because, if the CCOs' monitoring uncovered legal
violations, they could hand the matter over to the general counsel's office. In
addition, from a historical perspective, legal departments initially performed
compliance tasks, and only gradually did compliance departments (and
compliance officers) separate organizationally from them. 165
As noted above, the compliance function manages legal risk and thus
nominally fits within the ERM framework. 166 Accordingly, the CCO could be
placed in the reporting line to the CRO, which occurs in some organizations. 167
Yet, as also observed earlier,1 68 although compliance today takes a risk-based
approach, in that compliance officers are expected to do an analysis of legal risks
before formulating their compliance programs, ERM does not completely
harmonize with compliance. While CCOs may privately acknowledge that they
cannot prevent every legal violation and will devote their resources to the most
serious legal risks, they cannot publicly acknowledge that the organization will
accept a certain amount of legal violations in the same way that CROs design a
risk-management program where the organization bears certain risks.1 69
The reporting line (again in the strong sense) of the CRO is not without its
issues as well. Given that the management of risk is an essential part of all
business, an organization may decide to have multiple CROs, or risk officers,
embedded in different business divisions, or even no risk officers at all (with
business executives performing that function instead), rather than having only
one CRO who oversees risk management for the organization. 170 CRO or risk
officer reporting could thus be diffused and firm specific, and it might even be to
a management-level risk committee, rather than to a senior executive. 171 The
issue of what kind of reporting the CRO should make to the governing authority
remains (that is, should it be only informational?), but it does not make much
sense for the authority to be heavily involved in directing risk management
practices (as opposed to overseeing them) in a typical organization because
many organizational actors, directed by senior executives, are typically engaged
merits of the separation). There is survey data available about the chief compliance officer's reporting
line, with some data indicating that direct reporting to the general counsel is becoming less prevalent
in business firms today. See LRN, THE 2015 REPORT, supra note 158, at 7 (showing that, collectively,
chief compliance officers report more to others, such as the audit committee and the chief executive
officer, than to the general counsel, although the latter remains the largest single reporting line);
SOC'y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS & NYSE GOVERNANCE SERVS., supra note 147, at 11.
165. See Griffith, supra note 14, at 2101-02 (discussing this movement of the compliance
function into its own department with a chief compliance officer reporting directly to the chief
executive officer, although presenting survey data showing continuing organizational links between
that officer and the legal department).
166. See supra text accompanying note 112.
167. See LRN, THE 2015 REPORT, supra note 158, at 7.
168. See supra text accompanying note 85.
169. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
170. See generally MILLER, supra note 39, at 151-53 (discussing the CRO position generally and
providing data on how common the position has become).
171. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECr, supra note 2, § 3.09.
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in risk management at all levels of an organization.172
In addition, internal control officers, like the CCO and CRO, and their
supporters may prefer that their "strong" reporting runs only to the CEO, not to
other senior executives. 173 This reporting line would give them a seat at the
CEO's conference table, would reflect the institutional importance of their
internal control functions, would ensure that they have access to the CEO on
internal control matters, as opposed to having their concerns passed along
through another executive, and would also likely mean that the internal control
officers are themselves senior executives. 174 This reporting would also reflect the
professional project of compliance officers, who want their position to be
recognized as an independent internal control activity that is governed by
established principles of practice and that has the same authority as do lawyers
and general counsels of an organization.175 If the CCO is a lesser officer or
executive, this professional project is undermined, or at least not promoted,
because the compliance officer position would have less organizational status
and recognition. A similar professional story could be made about the position of
the CRO and risk officers. 176
The ALI Compliance Project does not take a firm position on this reporting
issue, because we want to acknowledge the different reporting solutions that
organizations adopt and to provide them with the flexibility to structure this
reporting as they see fit. Certainly, it recommends, particularly for large
organizations, that the CCO and CRO report directly to senior executives like
the CEO, not through another reporting line.177 As noted above, this enhances
the organizational importance of the internal control functions and encourages
the CEO to deal with compliance and risk-management issues as part of
decisionmaking and strategy. And it reflects the trend in organizations. 7 8
The second reporting issue, which was already discussed in connection with
the governing authority's responsibilities, is to whom, other than senior
executives, internal control officers provide reports about their internal control
172. See INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, supra note 68, at 149 ("Depending
on the size and complexity of the organization, dedicated risk and control personnel may support
functional management to manage different risk types (e.g., operational, financial, quantitative,
qualitative) by providing specialized skills and guidance to front-line management and other personnel
and evaluating internal control.").
173. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR FOR PREVENTIVE LAW, supra note 13, at 81-82 (discussing how to
enhance top compliance official's authority by having that officer be a senior executive who reports to
the CEO).
174. See id. at 82-84 (referencing these issues).
175. See Christine Parker, Lawyer Deregulation via Business Deregulation: Compliance
Professionalism and Legal Professionalism, 6 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 175, 188-89 (1999) (discussing the
creation of a new compliance profession); John H. Walsh, Institution-Based Financial Regulation: A
Third Paradigm, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381,411-12 (2008) (discussing the internal control project).
176. See generally Mikes, supra note 16 (discussing the growth in importance of CROs).
177. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3.16(a) & cmt. a (CCO); id. § 3.17(a) &
cmt. a (CRO).
178. See, e.g., LRN, THE 2015 REPORT, supra note 158, at 7-8 (giving CCO reporting
structures).
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function and other information. The Project recommends that the CCO and the
CRO have an informational reporting line to the governing authority or to a
committee of that authority.179 The CCO could report to a compliance
committee, and the CRO could report to the risk committee; in the absence of
these committees, both could report to the audit committee or to the full
governing authority. This governance structure would reinforce the
independence of the control officers from senior executives and would further
the governing authority's oversight of compliance and risk management, as was
discussed above.180
The governing authority, or its committee, would have to work out the
details of the reporting relationship of the internal control officers with it. The
ALI Compliance Project recommends that the CCO and the CRO could provide
regular reports and updates about their control function's activities to the
governing authority (or a committee) and meet with it outside the presence of
the CEO and other senior executives.18 1 Having regular meetings not only
ensures that the governing authority stays up-to-date on developments in
compliance and risk management and the activities of the programs, but also
deflects any implication to others in the organization that there is a serious issue
involving the compliance and risk-management programs every time there is
such a meeting. 182 Allowing the governing authority (or a committee) to approve
the hiring, firing and conditions of employment of the CCO and the CRO is not
intended to infringe the senior executives' authority over these officers, but only
to enhance the oversight of the governing authority.183 An important question is
whether it should be a standard approach for all large organizations.
CONCLUSION
This Essay, based on remarks given at Temple Law Review's 2017
symposium, has introduced the reader to several governance issues facing the
drafters of the ALI Compliance Project, where I have the responsibility for its
part on governance of compliance and risk management. After setting forth the
background of compliance and risk management, I discussed two general, but
related, governance issues that the Project has addressed: (i) the governing
179. See ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3.16(b)(8), (11) (describing the CCO's
reporting); id. § 3.17(b)(7), (10) (describing the CRO's reporting).
180. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 134-36.
182. Compliance authorities speak about the need for direct access of the CCO (or someone in
this position) to the governing authority. See, e.g., COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS-
GUIDELINES, supra note 13, at 11. The reporting deals with regular activities of the internal control
functions, but it may also deal with specific issues, such as compliance violations and "hot" issues in
compliance. See, e.g., PwC, supra note 147, at 7 (discussing the various kinds of reporting that CCOs
make to boards). The regular meetings discussed above would be in addition to those dealing with a
common oversight function, which is to assess annually the effectiveness of the compliance and risk
management programs. See id. at 16 (identifying this as one task of a compliance committee, albeit a
managerial committee).
183. See supra notes 117-24.
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authority's oversight of compliance and risk management and (ii) the reporting
of internal control officers, chiefly the CCO and the CRO. In the first, the
governing authority's role was presented as understandably reactive insofar as
senior executives propose for its approval compliance and risk-management
programs that are designed primarily by the CCO and CRO, respectively. I then
explored how the governing authority, or one of its committees, engages in its
oversight of compliance and risk management by approving the hiring, firing and
conditions of employment of the internal control officers and conducting
investigations and resolutions of material failures or violations of the compliance
program or material failures of or deviations from the risk-management
program. Another particularly interesting issue discussed here is the governing
authority's contribution to the culture or values of the firm, the well-known
"tone at the top."1 84
The second issue raised above involved reporting by the CCO and the
CRO, which, as was explained, could be of two kinds, and the Project's
treatment of them. As explained, the first kind of reporting, where an executive
directs the internal officer's work and determines the officer's conditions of
employment, generally deals with the appropriate place and role of compliance
and risk management in an organization's hierarchy. Having the CCO and the
CRO under the direct authority of the CEO or other senior executives could
elevate their importance, and that of their internal control functions, in the
organization. This Essay then explained that the second kind of reporting, where
internal control officers provide information and reports about the activities of
their internal control functions to the governing authority helps the governing
authority fulfill its oversight obligation. It observed that, in its treatment of both
kinds of reporting, the Project provides flexibility to organizations, which reflects
the diversity of organizational practice, while recommending reporting that
would enhance the oversight of the governing authority and the status and
function of the CCO and the CRO.
The Essay is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the Project's
treatment of the governance of compliance and risk management, particularly
since the Project is still in its drafting stage. Moreover, as the above discussion
demonstrates, the Project takes a non-prescriptive approach that offers
organizations different governance possibilities and structures. This approach
reflects that the governance of compliance and risk management is evolving in
organizations, as the compliance and risk-management functions assume more
importance in them.185 As the Project suggests, there is no "one size fits all"
governance solution for all organizations, including as to the oversight duties of
the governing authority and the related reporting lines of the CCO and the
CRO.186 Yet the ALI Compliance Project also recognizes that certain
184. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
185. See CONTROL RISKS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ATTITUDES TO COMPLIANCE: REPORT
2017, at 6 (2017) (observing that compliance is now fully integrated into most successful international
companies).
186. ALI COMPLIANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 2.01 reporter's note ("Organizations need
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governance outcomes are emerging, at least for large organizations, which are
those that regulators and other government authorities have mandated, or
encouraged, for organizations in the domains under their authority.187
Accordingly, the ALI Compliance Project might be especially timely because of
this coalescence of governance outcomes, which it will also reflect and to which it
will lend its support.
flexibility in their governance of internal-control functions to reflect their specific circumstances.").
187. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text for examples.
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